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COORDINATION AND CONFLICT:       
THE PERSISTENT RELEVANCE OF 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
ROBERT B. AHDIEH* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, scholarly enthusiasm about transnational 
regulatory networks has experienced something of a boom-and-bust cycle. Such 
networks—informal groupings of mid-level national officials, convened to 
develop nonbinding “soft law” norms of behavior in specialized fields of 
regulation—were identified as an important new phenomenon, were studied 
widely, and came to be seen as central pillars of the international legal order. 
Yet today, regulatory networks go largely unmentioned in polite academic 
conversation: a kind of “he-who-must-not-be-named” of international law. 
In the work of Kal Raustiala, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and David Zaring1—
who drew on Bob Keohane and Joseph Nye’s study of “transgovernmental 
relations,”2 and who were later joined by Janet Koven Levit, Charles 
Whitehead, and others3—transnational regulatory networks were foregrounded 
as a distinctive framework of transnational governance, falling somewhere 
between treaty-based international organizations and one-off incidents of 
international cooperation. Particularly in the realm of international financial 
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 1.  See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (highlighting 
transgovernmental networks as a distinctive framework of transnational governance); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (same); David 
Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory 
Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998) (same). 
 2.  See generally Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and 
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974) (exploring the distinct importance of 
“transgovernmental” interactions in international relations). 
 3.  See generally Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The 
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005) (analyzing growth of 
transnational governance); Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?—International Norms, Signals, 
and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695 (2006) (same). 
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regulation—where an alphabet soup of transnational regulatory networks, 
including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Action 
Task Force, the Financial Stability Forum, the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors, and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) were busy at work—scholars and practitioners alike 
came to see networks as essential sources of international order. 
In her seminal study of transnational regulatory networks, A New World 
Order, Slaughter took the theretofore largely descriptive literature of networks 
a step further, casting them as a solution to the paradox of globalization.4 
Engaging the unavoidable challenges that globalization has forced upon us, 
while avoiding the dangers of world government, networks emerge in 
Slaughter’s account as the optimal means of collective action in a shrinking 
world. 
As dramatically as networks emerged as a mainstay in the study of 
international order, however, they fell from grace just as quickly. Consider a bit 
of modest empirics: after a decade of growth in law journal references to 
“transnational networks,” “transgovernmental networks,” and “regulatory 
networks,” such mentions peaked in 2010. In the years since, they have been in 
steady decline.5 
In no small part, this change can be traced to the financial crisis that swept 
the globe in 2008. As David Zaring has highlighted, transnational regulatory 
networks did not play a significant role in either preventing or responding to the 
financial crisis.6 In many areas of international relations, where networks have 
never been seen to play a central role, this might be of little note. The marginal 
relevance of networks to the financial crisis, by contrast, constituted a fairly 
damning critique of their utility, given longstanding emphasis on the financial 
market’s regulatory networks as preeminent exemplars of the role that 
networks could play. Adding insult to this injury was the close nexus between 
the specific mandates of the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Forum, 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, IOSCO, and other 
regulatory networks, and precisely the type of risk exposures and systemic 
market failures that characterized the financial crisis. 
But the Thermidor of the transnational regulatory network “revolution” 
arises out of a broader and more foundational set of critiques than simply the 
failure of networks to save us from the financial crisis. This brief article engaged 
one among those challenges to the utility of transnational regulatory networks 
in global governance. In important recent work, scholars have questioned the 
ability of networks to play a meaningful role when relevant national preferences 
 
 4.  See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 5.  Author’s calculation based on search of Westlaw Law Reviews and Journals database (Feb. 26, 
2015) (on file with author). 
 6.  See generally David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
475, 478–86 (2010). 
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are in conflict.7 Whatever capacity regulatory networks might have where 
interests are aligned, the argument goes, they have little to offer in the far more 
widespread universe of situations in which nations disagree. 
In significant part, this critique has been grounded on invocations of game 
theory—a longstanding source of insight into international relations and 
governance.8 But challenges to the relevance of transnational regulatory 
networks in the face of conflict misunderstand the lessons of game theory. 
Contrary to what may be emerging as the conventional wisdom, game theory 
actually helps to suggest why networks can play an important role in settings 
characterized by conflict. 
Rather than simply an exercise in applied mathematics, however, an 
understanding of the capacity of networks to help regulate the international 
financial markets has important implications for questions of institutional 
design. Especially since the financial crisis, scholars and policymakers have 
debated the optimal institutional framework for international financial 
regulation.9 One might array the universe of choices along a spectrum ranging 
from highly formalized international institutions with significant political and 
legal authority, to ad hoc and informal agreements that address a single issue of 
bilateral concern. In between, one might variously situate high-level political 
gatherings such as the G-7 or G-20; hard law agreements established by 
multilateral or bilateral treaty, but lacking any institutional structure; and, of 
course, transnational regulatory networks.10 
From the crucible of the financial crisis, observers have drawn divergent 
conclusions as to the choice among these alternatives. Some have argued for the 
need to create a “World Financial Organization” akin to the World Trade 
Organization.11 Others have called for increased treaty making in the field of 
financial regulation, but without the creation of new institutional structures.12 
And yet others see regionalism and ad hoc coordination as the best that can be 
hoped for.13 Each of these positions may have its merits. To the extent it relies 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327 (2010); 
Matthew C. Turk, Reframing International Financial Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis: 
Rational States and Interdependence, Not Regulatory Networks and Soft Law, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59 
(2014); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 113 (2009). 
 8.  See Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in COOPERATION UNDER 
ANARCHY 28 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) (explaining utility of game theory in the study of 
international relations). 
 9.  See, e.g., Giulio Napolitano, The Two Ways of Global Governance After the Financial Crisis: 
Multilateralism Versus Cooperation Among Governments, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 310 (2011). 
 10.  See Turk, supra note 7, at 71–72 (reviewing variety of institutions at work in international 
financial regulation). 
 11.  See, e.g., Barry J. Eichengreen, Out of the Box Thoughts About the International Financial 
Architecture (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/116, 2009). 
 12.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 366–70 (arguing for the creation of a World Financial 
Organization). 
 13.  See generally Turk, supra note 7, at 115–18. 
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on the incapacity of networks to navigate conflict, however, it is grounded in 
false premises. As a new architecture of international financial regulation is 
built in the coming years, policymakers should not abandon the role of 
transnational regulatory networks without reason. 
The argument herein is thus a modest one: the capacity of transnational 
regulatory networks to play a central role in global governance—whether in 
international financial regulation or elsewhere—should not be dismissed merely 
because relevant national interests are not aligned. Conflict alone does not 
obviate the role of networks.14 
By contrast, the argument is not that networks are invariably effective in the 
face of conflict, nor more generally—including by comparison with more formal 
institutions. In fact, formal institutions may be crucial in navigating certain 
forms of transnational conflict. Nor does this article embrace the defense of 
networks as apolitical decision-making structures, operating separate and apart 
from the policy preferences of their national members.15 Various critiques of the 
efficacy of networks may thus be justified,16 and it is clearly correct that distinct 
circumstances will dictate a broader or narrower role for transnational 
networks.17 
Part II of this article frames the operative challenge to networks, reviewing 
the critiques of transnational regulatory networks offered by two leading 
scholars of international financial regulation: Chris Brummer and Pierre 
Verdier. Specifically, it highlights the distinction these scholars draw between 
strategic settings that are in the nature of coordination games, in which they see 
networks as having an impact, versus the more familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
other conflictual game settings, in which they see networks as incapable of 
having any meaningful role. 
Part III reveals this dichotomous account of network utility to be false. 
After reviewing the basic dynamics of coordination, part III highlights the ways 
in which the key characteristics of coordination can persist, even in the face of 
significant conflicts between the preferences of relevant players, as 
demonstrated by Thomas Schelling more than a half-century ago. On the 
foundation of that more robust account of the nature of coordination, part IV 
points to an array of ways in which transnational regulatory networks might 
play an important role even when national interests are in conflict—over 
divergent accounting standards; varying enforcement priorities; the relative 
dominance of international financial centers, including as between developed 
 
 14.  To be fair, Verdier emphasizes that he does not intend to dismiss the role of networks 
completely. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 116–17. This article seeks to push back, however, on the 
argument he offers for significantly limiting their role. 
 15.  Cf. id. at 116 (explaining that networks should not be viewed as apolitical structures). 
 16.  See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives: Networks, Salience, and Institutional Design 
in Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2010) (suggesting a particular critique of the role of 
networks amidst financial crises).  
 17.  See generally Brummer, supra note 7, at 354–55, 362–63. 
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markets and offshore financial centers; or otherwise. Finally, part V focuses on 
the setting of international financial regulation specifically, identifying 
particular dynamics of coordination as to which transnational regulatory 
networks might contribute, or are already doing so. 
II 
THE LIMITS OF NETWORKS IN CONFLICT 
After an extended run of nearly universal praise for their role in 
international relations generally, and especially in international financial 
regulation, transnational regulatory networks have hit something of a wall in 
recent years. In part, this can be traced to the global financial crisis, where 
networks played a far more modest role than might have been expected. But 
the real critique of transnational regulatory networks runs deeper than the 
crisis, to question the utility of networks more fundamentally. 
In a pair of articles published on the tail end of the financial crisis, Chris 
Brummer and Pierre Verdier—leading scholars of financial regulation, 
especially of the transnational variety—questioned the euphoria that had long 
characterized the study of transnational regulatory networks.18 In overlapping 
but distinct ways, each posited that widespread faith in networks as a 
centerpiece of the transnational legal order was misplaced. In most real-world 
circumstances, they argued, networks could not be helpful.19 
Starting from an intimate awareness of the international undertakings of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission—and particularly its aspirations to 
increased harmonization in securities law—Brummer argues that theories of 
“transgovernmentalism” fail to engage the full complexity of international 
financial regulation today.20 The challenges of today’s financial markets, he 
suggests, go beyond information asymmetries or a lack of trust: the types of 
issues that can be addressed by way of non-coercive regulatory networks 
focused on dialogue and an expanding web of bilateral memoranda of 
understanding. Rather, “conflicting regulatory philosophies . . . , differing costs 
of adjust[ment], and competition among financial centers” also stand in the way 
of any effective regime of transnational financial regulation.21 
Given the sharply contrasting competitive strategies preferred by developed 
economies versus offshore financial centers, for example, it is difficult to 
envision a dynamic of voluntary harmonization that could bring them together.22 
Whereas the former seek to offer a framework of stringent rules, and thereby 
 
 18.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330–31; Verdier, supra note 7, at 114–15. 
 19.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 327–33; Verdier, supra note 7, at 114–18. Echoing Brummer and 
Verdier’s criticisms, others have joined in questioning the capacity of networks to manage conflict. See, 
e.g., Turk, supra note 7.  
 20.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330 (using the term “transgovernmentalism” to capture theories 
of transnational regulatory networks as central to the international legal order). 
 21. Id. 
 22.  See id. at 353. 
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serve a bonding function, the latter aim to meet the demand for minimal 
constraint, transparency, and liability.23 The costs of adjustment, meanwhile, are 
both unevenly distributed, given that any point of convergence is likely to more 
closely approximate the regime of one jurisdiction than another, and more 
readily managed in those jurisdictions with an elaborate regulatory regime 
already in place.24 
To address such conflicting interests, Brummer argues, transnational 
regulatory networks, as distinct from more exclusive, more coercive, and 
otherwise more forceful institutional structures, cannot suffice.25 In place of 
transnational networks, therefore, Brummer counsels increased reliance on 
what he terms “governmental clubs.”26 More exclusive in their membership than 
many transnational regulatory networks, and operating across multiple 
functional areas of regulation, Brummer sees such clubs as better suited to 
navigate the conflict-laden landscape of international financial regulation today. 
Taking on transnational regulatory networks even more directly, Verdier 
suggests a limited role, if any, for networks in the face of “distributional” issues 
among relevant national jurisdictions.27 In line with Brummer’s concern about 
varying adjustment costs, Verdier questions whether networks can effectively 
navigate the distinct impact of alternative regulatory choices on one jurisdiction 
versus another.28 Thus, although networks might help to harmonize antifraud 
regulations among developed economies given those countries’ relatively 
aligned interests, networks cannot effectively navigate the conflicting interests 
between those nations and various offshore financial centers. For offshore 
financial centers, it is precisely the relative laxity of investor protection that they 
rely upon. 
National authorities can sometimes navigate such distributional imbalances 
by means of side payments.29 In the case of offshore financial centers, for 
example, some portion of the surplus generated for developed nations by 
harmonization of securities fraud rules might be channeled to those offshore 
centers that bear the costs of such changes, via subsidies to some other sector in 
 
 23.  See id. 
 24.  See id. at 351. 
 25.  Cf. id. at 364 (describing a shift away from traditional networks in international financial 
regulation). 
 26.  See id. at 364–66. Brummer highlights two examples of such clubs: First, the Multilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding developed by IOSCO, which the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission has promoted as a means to impose enforcement cooperation among those jurisdictions 
committed to a higher standard of securities regulation—in some contrast with network frameworks 
open to all comers. See id. at 366–67. Second, the bilateral framework of “mutual recognition,” by 
which the Commission would accept the regulatory regime of selected jurisdictions as a surrogate for 
the imposition of U.S. rules. See id. at 368. It bears noting, however, that the Multilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding, with its genesis in IOSCO, is seen by many as a traditional network institution. See 
infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 27.  See Verdier, supra note 7, at 124–25. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See id. at 124–25, 128. 
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need. But this possibility only presents itself when relevant negotiations occur 
across multiple issue areas. In Verdier’s account of transnational regulatory 
networks, however, networks lack such cross-functionality, thus limiting their 
ability to offer side payments.30 
Beyond networks’ inability to navigate distributional issues, Verdier also 
posits their limited utility where some potential for enforcement is necessary.31 
Whatever its early successes, thus, Verdier casts the ultimate inadequacies of 
the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy to have been grounded in the Basel 
Committee’s inability to enforce its agreed terms.32 
Enforcement concerns do not present themselves, of course, when interests 
are fully aligned. Transnational regulatory networks can readily facilitate the 
pursuit of criminal enterprises that are illegal in all nations of interest, for 
example.33 Monitoring and enforcement are unnecessary in such a circumstance. 
In the many settings in which national interests are not so perfectly aligned, by 
contrast, Verdier posits networks to be of limited efficacy. In Verdier’s account, 
thus, networks are only useful where relevant “standards and procedures . . . are 
beneficial to all states” and entail nothing more than “uncontroversial technical 
solutions.”34 
In advancing these overlapping critiques of transnational regulatory 
networks, Brummer and Verdier each rely on the lessons of game theory. In 
their view, game theory helps to suggest both when regulatory networks might 
be useful and, more importantly, the far wider range of circumstances in which 
they have little to offer. Brummer thus accuses transgovernmentalists of 
focusing too singularly on transnational interactions that can be understood as 
coordination games—and specifically as so-called Assurance games.35 In these 
settings, including those in which information asymmetry and lack of trust are 
the primary barriers to harmonization in financial regulation, each party would 
prefer to invest the time and resources necessary for coordination at an optimal 
 
 30.  See generally id. 
 31.  See id. at 125–26. 
 32.  See id. at 137–38. 
 33.  See id. at 123. 
 34.  Id. at 115. 
 35.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330. Among the most common Assurance games is the Stag 
Hunt game. See id. In Stag Hunt, the players can collectively choose to hunt a stag, in hopes of securing 
the greater rewards of doing so. But each player can alternatively (and more predictably) catch hare 
alone. This dynamic generates the following payoffs (with the relevant equilibria marked by asterisks):  
  Hunt Stag   Hunt Hare 
Hunt Stag       (4,4)*       (-1,1) 
Hunt Hare       (1,-1)       (1,1)* 
 
In this setting, each player would prefer to coordinate around joint pursuit of the stag. But if they fear 
the other hunter may fail to adopt that strategy, or may abandon it at the first sight of a hare, each does 
better to abandon the stag hunt himself, and at least have some rabbit for dinner. Id. 
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Nash equilibrium.36 In the absence of relevant information about the likely 
conduct of their counterpart, or a lack of trust, however, each is also 
incentivized to avoid being the sucker and embracing a higher standard alone.37 
The resulting risk is coordination around the suboptimal Nash equilibrium—a 
weaker standard or no standard at all—with lower investment by each national 
regulator, and lower social and individual returns.38 
Although transnational regulatory networks can be helpful in resolving such 
Assurance games, Brummer argues that information asymmetry and mistrust 
are not the most crucial barriers to regulatory alignment in most cases.39 Rather, 
the aforementioned divergences in regulatory philosophies and in adjustment 
costs, as well as jurisdictional competition, are the true obstacles of concern.40 
In these settings, the dynamic is not that of an Assurance game, but rather 
that of the Battle of the Sexes.41 In the Battle of the Sexes, players continue to 
prefer a coordinated result. Each, however, prefers coordination at a different 
Nash equilibrium.42 Given this added element of conflicting preferences, 
Brummer suggests, transnational regulatory networks cannot facilitate 
coordination effectively.43 Rather, when the Battle of the Sexes characterizes 
the relationship among national financial market regulators, more coercive and 
exclusive structures become necessary.44 
 
 36.  See id. at 344. Nash equilibria are those results from which no player will deviate, absent a 
change in the payoffs or the strategy choice of other players. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 876 (2003). 
 37.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 344. 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  See id. at 330, 345. 
 40.  See id. at 350–53. 
 41.  See id. at 345. In the Battle of the Sexes, husband and wife each wishes to spend an evening 
together, but they have different preferences as to where they would like to spend it. The payoffs are 
thus as follows: 
 
     Ballet     Boxing 
Ballet       (5,3)*       (1,1) 
Boxing       (-1,-1)       (3,5)* 
 
Row player (let us assume the wife) would prefer to attend the ballet rather than boxing, but would 
rather attend boxing with her husband, than the ballet alone. Symmetrically, column player (the 
husband) would rather see a boxing match, but would choose the ballet over going to boxing by 
himself. Id. 
 42.  Even among regulators equally committed to robust access to capital, for example, one might 
expect divergent preferences as to the necessary scope of disclosure, depending on their national firms’ 
relative reliance on the capital markets versus bank financing. Id. at 350. Varying adjustment costs, 
especially where relevant financial regulations implicate corporate governance structures, may be to 
similar effect. Id. at 351. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  Brummer further invokes game theory in his suggestion that the regulation of systemic risk, 
given its extraterritorial effects and the consequent alignment of national-level incentives associated 
with it, constitutes a relatively pure coordination game. Brummer, supra note 7, at 363. 
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To related effect, Verdier sorts the operative dynamics at work in 
international financial regulation into three clusters of games: pure 
coordination games, Battle of the Sexes games, and Prisoner’s Dilemma games. 
Pure coordination arises in situations that involve information dissemination, 
the development of best practices, and the establishment of regulatory 
frameworks where they have not existed before.45 These situations are relatively 
uncommon, or at least fairly limited in scope, yet it is here that transnational 
regulatory networks such as IOSCO and the Basel Committee have the greatest 
potential to play a role, in Verdier’s account.46 Because these situations do not 
involve any meaningful divergence in interests, preferences, or priorities, they 
do not necessitate formal or coercive institutions, and networks will suffice.47 
By contrast, Verdier does not see a role for networks where distributional or 
enforcement concerns exist, given the distinct game dynamics that arise in that 
circumstance. Distributional issues, to begin, give rise to a Battle of the Sexes 
game.48 Given their divergent preferences, each player seeks the embrace of his 
own preferred equilibrium, even though the players agree, at least at some 
level, on the desired ends. By holding out, Verdier suggests, each hopes the 
other might eventually come over to his side.49 Some such dynamic might be 
expected to play out in any effort to harmonize the substantive antitrust rules 
governing resale price agreements, for example, as distinct from the 
aforementioned coordination of antitrust enforcement.50 
Even more problematic are situations in which there is a need for 
enforcement. Even after reaching agreement, parties may face the temptation 
to defect from that agreement in pursuit of immediate gains, as in individual 
nations’ use of technical barriers to limit the effect of multilateral trade 
agreements.51 Similarly, in financial regulation, a given regulatory authority 
might consider reneging on a securities enforcement memorandum of 
understanding that mandates information exchange upon receipt of its 
counterpart’s data.52 This, of course, is the classic dynamic of the Prisoner’s 
 
 45.  See Verdier, supra note 7, at 167. As tested on Schelling’s students more than a half-century 
ago, the “Meeting Place” dynamic of pure coordination manifests itself in the desire of two friends, 
separated in New York City with no means of communication, to find each other. See THOMAS 
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 56 (1981). Needing to determine both a time and place to 
meet, both must engage in an exercise in recursive expectations, in which each tries to determine where 
the other will expect him to expect her to expect him to expect her to look for him, ad infinitum. Id. 
 46.  See Verdier, supra note 7, at 123. Among other examples, Verdier cites the coordination of 
enforcement actions against a mutually criminalized transnational cartel and joint efforts to curtail 
money laundering as falling within this range. See id. at 123, 167. 
 47.  See id. at 123. 
 48.  See generally Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities 
Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 61 (1999) (describing the Battle of the Sexes). 
 49.  See Verdier, supra note 7, at 124. 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  See id. at 125. 
 52.  See Eduard H. Cadmus, Revisiting the SEC’s Memoranda of Understanding: A Fresh Look, 33 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1800, 1849 (2010). 
AHDIEH_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2016  1:22 PM 
84 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:75 
Dilemma.53 To avoid that game’s familiar pathologies, in turn, some alteration 
in the operative payoffs is needed—a change that transnational regulatory 
networks are not empowered to impose.54 
As part III demonstrates, a game theoretic account of international financial 
regulation turns out to be more complex than the accounts of Brummer and 
Verdier suggest. Conflicting interests need not give rise to a dynamic of 
defection, nor to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which reflects that incentive.55 The 
conflict that characterizes the Battle of the Sexes, meanwhile, involves far 
greater alignment of interests than Brummer or Verdier acknowledge. 
Ultimately, conflict may be fully consistent with a game of coordination, and 
hence, with a role for transnational regulatory networks in international 
financial regulation. 
III 
RECONCILING COORDINATION AND CONFLICT IN GAME THEORY 
By invoking game theory to question the importance of transnational 
networks in international financial regulation, the foregoing critiques are 
correct in their starting point: in its most basic form, the dynamic of 
coordination takes the form of a pure coordination game. As exemplified in 
Schelling’s famous Meeting Place game, such pure coordination involves no 
element of varying interests, differing preferences, or conflict.56 What the critics 
of transnational regulatory networks overlook, however, is the persistence of 
coordination even with the introduction of conflict. 
A. The Dynamics of Coordination 
To understand the flaw in the criticisms of transnational regulatory 
networks, it is useful to start with coordination in its pure form. At heart, what 
 
 53.  The payoffs of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are as follows: 
 Stay Silent     Confess 
Stay Silent       (1,1)       (10,0) 
Confess       (0,10)       (5,5)* 
If both prisoners remain silent, they can only be convicted on (for example) a gun possession charge 
carrying a sentence of one year. By offering each prisoner the opportunity to walk free if they confess 
alone, however, the prosecutor can prompt both to do so, with the result that neither confession is 
needed individually, and each prisoner ends up incarcerated for five years. The incentive to defect in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma—to confess—thus generates a socially “suboptimal” equilibrium. 
 54.  See Verdier, supra note 7, at 125. Repeat plays are, of course, among the most important 
means for solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 55.  “[I]n analyzing international securities regulation, the Prisoners’ Dilemma is a useful paradigm 
in only a few of the problems that arise in practice.” Licht, supra note 48, at 65; see also Robert B. 
Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 600–
07 (2010); Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and 
Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009). 
 56.  See SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 56 (describing the Meeting Place game task of finding one’s 
friend in New York City, without the ability to communicate). 
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made Thomas Schelling’s Meeting Place game interesting—or uninteresting, as 
the case may be—was that its solution lay not in changing the incentives of the 
players, but simply in shaping their expectations.57 In seeking to locate one’s 
friend in New York, thus, there is no flaw in either individual’s incentives, or in 
their collective ones. Nor is there any issue of trust. Rather, the obstacle to 
effective coordination is each friend’s inability to develop confident 
expectations of what their friend will do. This constitutes the essential point of 
contrast between a coordination game, be it the pure coordination dynamic of 
the Meeting Place game or any number of more conflictual coordination games, 
and the Prisoner’s Dilemma and other games not characterized by coordination. 
In the conflictual Prisoner’s Dilemma, the motivating challenge is the 
players’ incentive to defect. Given the payoff structure, both players in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma are incentivized to abandon a socially optimal outcome in 
favor of an equilibrium that is both socially and individually inferior. Critically, 
this incentive exists independent of the strategy played by the other player. Each 
player thus has a dominant strategy of defection—that is, confession—
regardless of whether his counterpart chooses to remain silent or to confess. 
Displacing the parties’ dominant strategy thus becomes the essential response 
to a Prisoner’s Dilemma–like payoff structure. 
By contrast, the challenge in the Meeting Place and other coordination 
games is not the presence of a dominant strategy and the resulting expectation 
of defection. Rather, the challenge is the presence of multiple Nash equilibria: 
multiple strategy combinations that are interdependent in their payoffs, and 
that neither party will have reason to abandon, once they are established. Each 
player’s preferred strategy in a coordination game thus depends on the strategy 
played by the other. Yet they may fail to coordinate around aligned strategies, 
given the presence of multiple potential equilibria from which to choose. 
Given the distinct challenges that underlie coordination games and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the means to those ends might likewise be expected to 
differ. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma and similar settings, law and regulation are 
drawn upon to alter the incentives of relevant players. By changing the 
operative payoffs, legal interventions eliminate the incentive to defect—be it in 
environmental law, securities regulation, or elsewhere.58 
While one could address coordination games in a similar fashion as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the natural solution lies elsewhere. At least in the first 
instance, coordination games need not be solved by altering the incentives of 
the relevant players. Why? Because in a coordination game, the incentives of 
 
 57.  See Raustiala, supra note 1, at 24; see also Verdier, supra note 7 (describing the Meeting Place 
game). 
 58.  Issue linkage often serves as a means to alter payoffs in international relations, including 
payoffs in international financial regulation. See Licht, supra note 48, at 89; see also id. at 91–92 
(comparing the capacity of the European Union versus IOSCO to navigate the Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
When the relevant payoffs generate a Prisoner’s Dilemma, institutions with cross-substantive 
jurisdiction may be able to reduce the incentive to defect, by linking any such defection to the 
imposition of costs in other areas of necessary cooperation. 
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the parties are not (at least inherently) the source of any coordination failure 
that might occur, or of the parties’ coordination around a suboptimal result. 
Rather, any such failure turns on their expectations—or, more precisely, on 
their inability to develop accurate expectations of one another. If I cannot 
predict where you will expect me to expect you to expect me to go, and so on, 
we may end up meeting further away than necessary. Worse, we may not find 
each other at all.59 
From this, it becomes easy to see why transnational regulatory networks 
might be an attractive tool for facilitating optimal coordination. With their 
noncoercive, information-oriented, and expertise-driven nature, transnational 
networks seem well suited to shaping expectations at the heart of any 
coordination game in transnational regulation. On the other hand, it is equally 
easy to see why one might question the capacity of networks once conflict is 
present. If relevant national regulators’ preferences diverge, one might expect 
transnational regulatory networks’ primary focus on information generation 
and dissemination, their inability to coerce, and their lack of meaningful 
political power to render them fairly ineffective tools to resolve the conflict. 
As it turns out, however, coordination is a more complex phenomenon than 
consideration of the Meeting Place game above might suggest. The same 
centrality of expectations and information that supports a place for networks in 
nonconflictual settings turns out to favor a role for them even when conflict is 
added to the mix. Understanding this requires consideration of the broader 
universe of coordination games. 
B. Coordination and Conflict 
From its origins, the study of coordination in game theory was primarily 
focused on conflict. Thomas Schelling, the leading expositor of coordination 
game theory in the economics literature, widely disseminated that work in his 
seminal, and Nobel Prize-recognized, book, The Strategy of Conflict.60 “To study 
the strategy of conflict,” he wrote, “is to take the view that most conflict 
situations are essentially bargaining situations. They are situations in which the 
ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree 
on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make.”61 
Schelling’s ultimate focus, thus, was not how friends might find each other in 
New York City, but rather how to understand the then-raging Cold War. More 
 
 59.  One might thus see the operative task in coordination games as two-fold: At a minimum, the 
goal is to avoid coordination failure. In the Meeting Place game, players hope to get to some common 
location rather than be separated. Beyond that, however, where one equilibrium is Kaldor–Hicks 
preferable to the other, the goal is get players to the optimal coordination point. See Matthew D. Adler 
& Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost–Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 190 (1999) (distinguishing 
Kaldor–Hicks and Pareto efficiency). In the Meeting Place game, for example, meeting closer to both 
players’ starting point would be preferable to the alternative meeting point.  
 60.  See SCHELLING, supra note 45; see also DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDY (1969). 
 61.  SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 5. 
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specifically, his concern was how to avoid that war turning hot: 
Viewing conflict behavior as a bargaining process is useful in keeping us from 
becoming exclusively preoccupied either with the conflict or with the common 
interest. To characterize the maneuvers and actions of limited war as a bargaining 
process is to emphasize that, in addition to the divergence of interest over the 
variables in dispute, there is a powerful common interest in reaching an outcome that 
is not enormously destructive of values to both sides. A “successful” employees’ strike 
is not one that destroys the employer financially, it may even be one that never takes 
place. Something similar can be true of war.
62
 
The examples of coordination dynamics explored by Schelling are similarly 
telling. In Schelling’s account, the decision not to use chemical weapons during 
World War II, or atomic weapons during the Korean War, can be understood as 
exercises in coordination. Even clearer is his reference to the recurrent 
resolution of military conflicts along the lines of physical boundaries, including 
the river that ran along the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, and the straits 
separating Taiwan from the Chinese mainland.63 Such a boundary, Schelling 
suggested, has significant capacity to shape expectations in conflict settings: 
If some troops have retreated to the river . . . , they will expect to be expected to make 
a stand. This is the one spot to which they can retreat without necessarily being 
expected to retreat further, while, if they yield any further, there is no place left where 
they can be expected to make a determined stand. Similarly, the advancing party can 
expect to force the other to retreat to the river without having his advance interpreted 
as an insatiable demand for unlimited retreat. There is stability at the river—and 
perhaps nowhere else.
64
 
This emphasis on the overlap of conflict and coordination in limited war, 
and in conflict situations more broadly, can be seen in the standard-form 
coordination games that introduce elements of conflict.65 In the “limited war” of 
the Battle of the Sexes, of course, the interests of the spouses are in self-evident 
conflict.66 Each one seeks coordination on his or her terms. And given as much, 
each is incentivized to bluff—and even lie—to get his or her way. Ultimately, 
however, the exercise remains one of coordination—with multiple equilibria, 
interdependent strategies, and a central role for mutual expectations. If the 
husband expects his wife to choose her preferred location in the end, he will go 
there as well. 
An even more extreme dimension of conflict can be seen in the Hawk–Dove 
game, in which each party prefers to play hawk, to the other party’s dove. In 
this coordination game, most commonly captured in the infamous game of 
“Chicken,” two drivers race toward each other, with each determined not to 
 
 62.  Id. at 5–6. 
 63.  See id. at 75–76. 
 64.  Id. at 71. 
 65.  Other coordination games with an element of conflict might also be identified. Cf. McAdams, 
supra note 55, at 226–27. But this article focuses on the standard-form games that are most commonly 
cited. 
 66.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330 (defining the Battle of the Sexes); see also supra note 41 
(same). 
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swerve.67 One prevails when he continues on unflinchingly, while the other 
swerves. The element of conflict could thus not be more acute. 
Yet the fundamental dynamic even in this conflict-laden game remains one 
of coordination. As in other coordination games, we see multiple equilibria. 
They are inverted strategies, to be sure, in which coordination occurs by our 
choice of opposite strategies. As with other Nash equilibria, though, the 
interdependence of our strategies renders any unilateral shift undesirable. If 
one driver is going to swerve, his opponent has no incentive to alter his strategy 
of continuing forward. If a given driver is not going to swerve, meanwhile, his 
opponent likewise has no incentive but to swerve. The “solution” to the Hawk–
Dove game, as a result, continues to turn on our expectations of one another. 
Depending on what each player expects of his counterpart, he will set his 
strategy accordingly.68 
Conflict is fully consistent, then, with coordination. The operative concern 
in both the Battle of the Sexes and Hawk–Dove games remains a failure of 
coordination—including potential coordination at a suboptimal equilibrium (if 
the payoffs were altered to include some Kaldor–Hicks efficiency ranking as 
between attendance at the ballet versus boxing, or in the emergence of one or 
the other player as the hawk). More significantly, there is no issue of defection 
in either game.69 Once a player expects a certain equilibrium to emerge, they 
have no reason to defect from it. The husband prefers to go to the ballet with 
his wife, than to go to a boxing match alone.70 And in the Hawk–Dove game, it 
is better to be the chicken than to be dead.71 The introduction of conflict, then, 
need not negate a dynamic of coordination. So long as any such conflict does 
not alter the players’ ultimate preference for coordination over the alternatives, 
the game to be played may remain one of coordination.72 
 
 67.  The resulting payoffs are as follows: 
 
     Swerve    Continue 
Swerve       (2,2)       (0,10)* 
Continue       (10,0)*    (-10,-10) 
 
 68.  One might include the Assurance (or Stag Hunt) game in this enumeration as well. See 
Brummer, supra note 7. The Stag Hunt captures not conflict per se, or even a lack of trust, but rather a 
lack of assurance that one’s counterpart will fulfill his part of the bargain. Notably, Brummer and 
Verdier do not seem to question the ability of networks to help navigate Assurance game dynamics. 
 69.  See Licht, supra note 48, at 101. 
 70.  See id. (“[T]here is no compelling need for any strong enforcement mechanism [in the Battle 
of the Sexes], because once an agreement is reached, it is self-enforcing.”). 
 71.  For either player in the matrix in note 67, the prospect of no payoff (0) is superior to the 
negative payoff of the southeast quadrant (-10). 
 72.  That Verdier’s conception of coordination excludes such conflictual dynamics is suggested by 
his focus on pure coordination. He thus emphasizes that in pure coordination games, “the optimal 
outcome is self-sustaining.” Verdier, supra note 7, at 123. In point of fact, that is true of any 
coordination game. To similar effect is his reference to situations in which “mere coordination” is 
needed. See id. at 168 (emphasis added). Brummer is broader in his conception of coordination; he 
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In Verdier’s framework, the existence of “distributional” concerns—and the 
resulting conflict between the relevant national authorities—does not mean that 
the operative dynamic is not still one of coordination. It is not one of pure 
coordination, to be sure, but it may yet be a Battle of the Sexes game, and 
hence still a coordination dilemma.73 Even enforcement concerns, for that 
matter—where they fall short of incentivizing defection—may still involve a 
multi-equilibrium coordination game. In the aforementioned dynamic of the 
Stag Hunt game, thus, there are “enforcement” problems of a sort.74 Yet, as in 
the Battle of the Sexes and Hawk–Dove, there is no incentive to defect.75 And 
coordination thus remains the operative concern. 
Stating the point more formally, strategies in Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, 
Hawk–Dove, and other coordination games remain interdependent. By contrast 
with the dominant strategy that characterizes the Prisoner’s Dilemma—and 
necessitates some coercive alteration in the payoffs to the parties, if a 
suboptimal outcome is to be avoided—players’ strategy choices in these 
coordination games continue to depend on the choices made by their 
counterparts. Just as in the pure coordination setting of the Meeting Place 
game, unless one changes what one does, one’s counterpart has no incentive to 
do so. The introduction of conflict, as such, does not inevitably generate an 
incentive to defect. 
Of course, the payoff structure in a particular, real-world setting of 
transnational regulation—whether conflictual or otherwise—may not be that of 
a coordination game. Further, the introduction of conflict could alter payoffs in 
a way that undermines any preexisting dynamic of coordination. At the 
extreme, it could even generate a Prisoner’s Dilemma, or some other payoff 
structure characterized by an incentive to defect. What is crucial, however, is 
that there is no necessary exclusivity between coordination and conflict, even 
when interests or preferences significantly diverge.76 
IV 
THE ROLE OF NETWORKS IN CONFLICT 
If transnational regulatory networks have a role to play in facilitating 
 
acknowledges the nature of the Battle of the Sexes as a coordination dynamic. See Brummer, supra 
note 7, at 330. Nonetheless, he describes settings characterized by a Battle of the Sexes dynamic as ill-
suited to coordination-driven approaches. See id. at 343–44 (describing networks’ role as limited to 
situations where relevant parties have “similar objectives and preferences”). 
 73.  Notably, Verdier casts distributional problems as giving rise to a Battle of the Sexes–type 
dynamic, but then engages that setting as if it were entirely distinct from the coordination game setting 
in which he sees networks to have their proper place. See Verdier, supra note 7, at 124. 
 74.  See supra note 35 (describing payoffs in the Stag Hunt game). 
 75.  Verdier wrongly equates enforcement problems with the risk of defection. See Verdier, supra 
note 7, at 115. 
 76.  In conflict-laden situations, Verdier suggests that national regulators may “hold out” in 
negotiations. See id. at 124. In that, he is quite right. They can also be expected to bluff—even lie. The 
critical point, however, is that the dynamic remains one of coordination, notwithstanding those 
countervailing incentives. 
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coordination in the absence of conflict, the foregoing suggests that a similar role 
might persist, even when conflict is present. How, then, might we expect 
networks to facilitate coordination—whether in the absence or presence of 
conflict? More precisely, after identifying four distinct ways in which 
coordination might fail to occur, what are the ways in which transnational 
regulatory networks might reduce the risk of failure? 
Four forms of coordination failure can be identified. Two forms may occur 
on the front end of any strategic interaction that necessitates coordination. 
First, no coordination equilibrium may emerge: friends or spouses may end up 
choosing different locations, one hunter may pursue stag while the other 
pursues hare, both cars may swerve or even collide, or trading across exchanges 
may be hampered by incompatible pricing or other standards. Second, even 
when players do successfully coordinate, they may do so around a relatively 
inefficient equilibrium.77 
A third potential risk—inefficient lock-in—compounds the second. Once a 
given coordination equilibrium has emerged, it may be difficult to displace it, 
however suboptimal it may be. Given the lack of incentive to unilaterally defect 
from any Nash equilibrium in a coordination game—notwithstanding the gains 
to mutual adjustment—such changes in strategy may not occur.78 Hence the 
stubborn persistence of suboptimal standards in many industries, even in the 
face of preferable alternatives. 
Finally, delays in the emergence of new innovations and entire markets are 
a fourth potential form of coordination failure. Given the various risks of non-
coordination, suboptimal coordination, and lock-in, the force of inertia may be 
strong at the outset of any coordination game. Unsure of what equilibrium may 
emerge—whether an efficient or inefficient one, or an otherwise preferred or 
disfavored one—and fearful of the (potentially costly) prospect of non-
coordination, players may simply choose not to play the game. 
How, then, are these various forms of coordination failure to be avoided? 
As with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, an effort might be made to alter players’ 
incentives in coordination game settings, whether by legal decree or otherwise. 
Such changes are not necessary, however, given the genesis of each of these 
potential failures not in the incentives of the parties, but rather in their inability 
to develop accurate expectations of one another. 
To avoid coordination failure, thus, each party to a coordination game must 
effectively determine what the other player is likely to expect of him. As 
Schelling describes it, “What is necessary is to coordinate predictions, to read 
the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course of action 
 
 77.  In the payoffs structures offered above, this cannot occur, given the corresponding payoffs to 
each equilibrium. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which one equilibrium may be Kaldor–
Hicks preferred to the other, however. In those cases, coordination at the lesser equilibrium constitutes 
coordination failure of a particular sort. 
 78.  For discussion of the possibility that communication may not effectively alleviate such lock-in 
effects, see Ahdieh, supra note 55, at 613–16. 
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that their expectations of each other can converge on. They must ‘mutually 
recognize’ some unique signal that coordinates their expectations of each 
other.”79 
Critical to this task, in Schelling’s account, are so-called “focal points.”80 
Where two friends seek to find each other in New York, a certain location, be it 
Grand Central Station or elsewhere, may be a focal point for decision. For 
spouses, the location of their last date might similarly be focal, whether it 
suggests a return to the ballet, or just the opposite. And for two boys racing 
toward each other in their cars, the question of who swerved last time may be 
focal in shaping their expectations. The “salience” of some given outcome, thus, 
can help to align the parties’ expectations.81 
If the shaping of expectations—perhaps especially by way of defining focal 
points for decision—is the key determinant of efficient coordination, can 
transnational regulatory networks contribute to that process? In a number of 
respects, transnational networks are especially well suited to doing so. To begin, 
optimal coordination will often turn on the collection, compilation, and 
dissemination of key information. The more a player knows, the more accurate 
he is likely to be in his evaluation of his counterpart’s likely choices. If there is 
any task for which transnational networks have been seen to be well suited, it is 
just such gathering and sharing of information. IOSCO’s generally praised 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, for example, can be seen in this 
light.82 By identifying (and ultimately addressing) key differences in 
enforcement, the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding has fostered 
significant improvements in the quality of cooperation in securities law 
enforcement. 
Beyond factual information per se, the shaping of expectations will often 
turn on relevant actors’ sense of one another. Greater familiarity thus enhances 
one’s capacity to develop an accurate judgment about what is likely to be focal 
to another. With their orientation to not simply recurrent, but ongoing and 
relatively low-stakes, engagement among participants, transnational regulatory 
networks provide an ideal mechanism for increased familiarity and 
socialization—and the increased accuracy of expectations that might be 
expected to follow from it.83 To related effect, one might think of transnational 
 
 79.  SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 54. 
 80.  See id. at 57–58. 
 81.  See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 89–90 
(1986). 
 82.  See Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and Ministry 
Networks, AM. J. INT’L. L. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 28–29) (on file with author); see also 
Antonio Marcacci, IOSCO: The World Standard Setter for Globalized Financial Markets, 12 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 23, 27 (2012). 
 83.  See Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 575, 611 (2009); Raustiala, supra note 1, at 55; Anne–Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a 
Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 314 (2004); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational 
Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1002 (2007); cf. Eric J. Pan, 
Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond 
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regulatory networks as an institutional framework for repeat plays. Such 
iteration is most commonly highlighted as a solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
In the work of Robert Axelrod and others, for example, players’ dominant 
strategies of defection were effectively displaced when each could credibly 
threaten retaliation in a future play.84 
Given the role of accurate expectations in the avoidance of coordination 
failures, repeated interactions may potentially be useful in coordination game 
settings as well. Each time the relevant game is played, each player gains 
enhanced insight into what to expect of his counterpart. By offering a forum for 
such recurrent engagement,85 networks may be useful in facilitating efficient 
coordination.86 
A final way in which transnational regulatory networks may play a role in 
shaping expectations stems from the fact that coordination games in 
transnational settings will usually be multiplayer rather than two-party games. 
Most commonly, a given player’s strategy will be a function of what he expects 
of a multiplicity of other players. And the same will be true of each of the other 
players. As one seeks to develop accurate expectations of another, then, the 
signals he is receiving from others may be critical—given that his strategy can 
be expected to depend on what he expects of each of them. Transnational 
networks’ agglomeration of broader collections of market participants may 
consequently be valuable in bringing together the various sources of 
expectation in question.87 
None of this changes when we add conflict to the mix. If transnational 
regulatory networks can help us adopt a common disclosure standard when we 
agree, it may also do so when we differ, for example, in our preference for U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles versus International Financial 
Reporting Standards. So long as we prefer a common accounting standard, even 
 
Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 252–53 (2010) (noting the role of repeat 
interactions in G-7, G-20, and similar national groupings); Whitehead, supra note 3, at 704–05 (citing 
relationship-building and professional socialization among characteristics of transnational regulatory 
networks). On the role of familiarity in coordination settings, see SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 57–58; 
Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 16, at 539–40. 
 84.  See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 54 (1984). In recent years, 
strategies besides Axelrod’s tit-for-tat have been identified as solutions in repeat play Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games. See, e.g., KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT II: JUST 
PLAYING 313–19 (1998). 
 85.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 86.  In earlier work, I have argued that the longevity of an institution or network may impact its 
ability to facilitate coordination. See Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note 16, at 539–41. The 
contributions of an older institution may thus be relatively more salient. The point above is a distinct 
one. By virtue of greater experience with each other, network participants may be better able to 
develop accurate expectations of one another. Cf. Licht, supra note 48, at 89–91, 93 (describing the 
European Union’s progressive work on disclosure rules, over an extended period of time and noting 
potential for IOSCO’s modest successes over time to impact its ability to succeed in more ambitious 
undertakings). 
 87.  Cf. Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial 
Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 157, 167 (2013) (suggesting role of “composition” of network in 
determining its impact). 
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if that standard is yours versus mine, expectations remain the key determinant 
of the result.88 If any given national regulator expects others to adopt its less 
favored standard, it will embrace that standard as well, as predicted by the 
Battle of the Sexes. 
In what ways, then, might transnational regulatory networks help to 
facilitate coordination in the face of conflict? At a minimum, networks offer a 
forum for members to signal one another as to the strength of their intention to 
stick to their guns.89 As with Schelling’s account of limited war, each player can 
utilize the network platform to forcefully assert his unwillingness to abandon his 
preferred course. Beyond mere assertion, networks offer a natural opportunity 
for nations to signal as much, by way of the provision of key information 
indicative of their commitment. More generally, like the river in Schelling’s 
account of military conflict,90 regulatory networks may facilitate players’ efforts 
to render focal their preferred outcome.91 By promoting their position in a 
network forum, parties may increase the salience of their preferences, and 
thereby shift expectations to their advantage. 
By contrast with bilateral interactions among players with conflicting 
interests, transnational regulatory networks create opportunities to engage 
other network participants in ways that may impact the accounting or other 
standard around which national regulators ultimately coordinate.92 As noted 
above, participation in network fora may help members develop more accurate 
expectations of the likely behavior of other network participants.93 But if one’s 
goal, given conflicting interests, is not merely to predict the ultimate 
equilibrium, but to shape it, networks may be even more useful. Thus, if one 
hopes to influence the expectations of a particular counterparty as to one’s 
commitment to one’s preferred standard, one powerful way to do so is through 
the behavior of yet other network participants. Where other members of the 
 
 88.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s gradual embrace of International Financial 
Reporting Standards, as their likelihood of market dominance became progressively clearer and 
clearer, is suggestive of this pattern. That its embrace followed years of forceful resistance may be even 
more telling. See William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: The SEC’s Roadmap to Accounting 
Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471 (2010). 
 89.  See Gadinis, supra note 87, at 167. 
 90.  See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 91.  Verdier acknowledges the role of focal points in coordination games. See Verdier, supra note 
7, at 129. Yet he seems to see their role as limited to pure coordination settings. See id. Brummer, by 
contrast, does not directly engage the role of focal points or salience. In the face of conflict, he suggests 
that “[c]oordination depends on other factors, like the order of play . . . . If, as is often the case, players 
move simultaneously, the result would be undeterminable and additional negotiations would be 
necessary.” Brummer, supra note 7, at 354. Those are precisely the circumstances in which focal points 
may determine the result. 
 92.  See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 795–96 
(2014); Raustiala, supra note 1, at 25, 27; cf. Michael S. Barr, Who’s In Charge of Global Finance?, 45 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 1002–03 (2014) (noting concerns about biases arising from the particular 
membership of a network); Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 
INT’L ORG. 1 (2000); David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 573–74 (2008). 
 93.  See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
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network embrace one’s preferred standard, or even abandon one’s competitor’s 
standard for one’s own, a strong impact on any given counterparty’s 
expectations is to be expected. 
The enumeration to this point suggests ways in which transnational 
regulatory networks might serve a useful role for national regulators playing a 
Battle of the Sexes game over their preferred standards. But one might also 
identify potential contributions of networks in even more conflictual settings. 
Transnational networks might help to define the boundaries of authority as 
multiple national regulators compete to assert their jurisdiction over a given 
complex transaction, for example. Assuming a standard public choice dynamic, 
each regulator might be expected to assert its jurisdiction, even while 
recognizing that duplicative exercises of jurisdiction would prove mutually 
harmful. In this Hawk–Dove dynamic, each national regulator seeks to press its 
claim, but only to the extent its counterpart, playing dove, will defer.94 
The assertion of jurisdiction is likewise an exercise in shaping expectations, 
for which purpose transnational regulatory networks may prove a helpful tool. 
This utility arises for the same reason it does when regulators compete over 
alternative standards. Especially given the self-evidently rhetorical exercise 
entailed in Hawk–Dove-style interactions, in fact, networks may be even more 
useful here than in Battle of the Sexes–style standards competitions. If a 
national regulator’s goal is to shape another’s expectation as to whether it will 
assert jurisdiction, one can readily see how the force of the regulator’s 
expression in a network forum, dedicated to collective action, would be 
relatively greater. By comparison with the regulator’s assertion of its intentions 
in a one-off, bilateral interaction, the setting of a transnational regulatory 
network setting may be especially useful for that purpose. 
As the latter example highlights, the role of transnational networks in 
conflictual settings may involve some significant dimensions of power, force, 
and even “coercion” of a sort. In that regard, critiques of transnational 
regulatory networks as involving the exercise of power by strong states is no 
critique at all.95 Whereas the operation of network structures—like every 
occasion for transnational engagement—is defined by the exercise of power and 
influence, it is not ineffective or irrelevant for that reason. 
Instead, the interesting question is how their role intersects with the 
dynamics of relative national power. Consider, for example, the potential 
utilization of transnational regulatory networks by historically strong states 
whose influence is on the decline.96 As the power of U.S. financial market 
 
 94.  Persistent elements of coordination may facilitate regulatory cooperation even where 
something of a Prisoner’s Dilemma is at work. The successful coordination between banking authorities 
in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg in navigating the failure of Dexia in 2008 exemplifies that 
possibility. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 11–12 (Mar. 
2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf. 
 95.  See Parella, supra note 92, at 795–96. 
 96.  The Securities and Exchange Commission’s gradual shift away from unilateral assertions of 
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regulators has waned over the last several decades with the rise of competing 
financial centers in London, Tokyo, Germany, Hong Kong, and elsewhere, U.S. 
financial regulators have relied to a far greater degree on transnational 
regulatory networks.97 Why?98 
In significant part, the answer may lie in the coordination dynamic at work. 
If the relational structure of regulatory networks permits more effective shaping 
of expectations, they might be attractive policymaking tools in the face of a 
nation’s declining ability to compel desired behavior. The same might be said of 
the collective nature of networks, which may enable the formerly strong 
regulator to leverage the expectations of any given national regulator to shape 
the expectations of others. 
But one might also see benefits of transnational regulatory networks for 
nonhegemonic states in the presence of conflicting interests. For national 
regulators with limited ability to force their position on others—be it their 
choice of standard, their assertion of jurisdiction, or otherwise—transnational 
networks might be attractive not only by virtue of their collective nature, but 
also given their relational character and rhetorical orientation. The 
opportunities for leverage arising from the relational character of transnational 
regulatory networks, as described above, are fairly clear.99 As to the networks’ 
rhetorical orientation, even relatively weak network participants have the 
opportunity to talk a big game in a network setting. And so long as the 
operative dynamic remains one of coordination, that talk must be taken 
seriously, or at least more seriously than it otherwise would be.100 By virtue of 
the forcefulness and consistency of its assertions, buttressed by its engagement 
with the network’s broad membership, a national regulator otherwise limited in 
its influence may be empowered to shape outcomes in a network setting.101 
Amir Licht has suggested a final potential benefit of transnational 
regulatory networks for relatively weaker states, in the face of conflicting 
interests. Where coordination underlies the incentives of the parties—
notwithstanding distinct preferences in their choice of equilibrium—
 
exterritorial jurisdiction might be understood in this light. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical 
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 876–79 (2006). As early as the late 1980s, however, the Commission 
began to express a preference for cooperative approaches. See Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation 
by Enforcement: An International Perspective, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 305, 310–20 (1990). 
 97.  Cf. Brummer, supra note 7, at 332; Derek N. White, Conduct and Effects: Reassessing the 
Protection of Foreign Investors from International Securities Fraud, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 81, 127 
(2009). 
 98.  Brummer suggests networks may be relatively less effective policy tools for the United States, 
as its power declines. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 355. But in fact, as described above, they may be 
especially useful, given that trend. 
 99.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 100.  Of course, this might be true of bilateral assertions as well. One could imagine that the 
network setting might be relatively more effective, however, as a vehicle for one state to influence the 
expectations of others. 
 101.  Brummer describes the various ways in which hegemonic powers may press for the embrace of 
their preferred norms and standards. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 343. Networks may also sometimes 
play a role, however, in helping nonhegemonic actors resist such pressures. 
AHDIEH_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2016  1:22 PM 
96 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:75 
transnational networks may offer a reputation-saving means for nations to 
embrace a disfavored equilibrium.102 “[O]rganizations like IOSCO may [] 
facilitate cooperation . . . by helping the smaller player to save face 
domestically. Thus, it may be considered more respectable to yield to IOSCO 
than to the SEC.”103 To be sure, one could easily overstate the importance of 
this role. At least in some circumstances, however, it may be of value.104 
Transnational regulatory networks have the capacity to play a significant 
role in international relations, then, even in the face of power differentials, 
distinct priorities, and divergent preferences. So long as relevant national 
authorities benefit more from coordination than from pursuing their particular 
preferences alone, networks can have an impact. That may be especially so in 
international financial regulation, given transnational networks’ already 
prominent place. 
V 
COORDINATION GAMES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Having seen a variety of ways in which transnational regulatory networks 
might facilitate coordination even in the face of conflict, it is useful to conclude 
by considering the potential role of the networks in international financial 
regulation more specifically. How might one expect the dynamics of 
coordination and conflict to play out in international financial regulation—the 
setting in which the role of transnational regulatory networks has been most 
directly challenged—and what are the implications for that role? 
At a minimum, transnational regulatory networks are expected to play a 
valuable role when national financial regulators are in relative agreement. 
There is widespread consensus as to the value of transnational networks in 
information-sharing, a critical dimension of financial market regulation.105 
Important aspects of the work of IOSCO can clearly be understood in this light, 
including the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding.106 The same can be 
said of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and even the 
Basel Committee, perhaps especially in its early years. Dating back to the 
earliest days of regulatory networks’ emergence as significant players in 
 
 102.  See Licht, supra note 48, at 97. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  At least some networks might—based on their particular composition, the formality of their 
jurisdiction, etc.—also be in a position to contribute by offering opportunities for issue linkage. Cf. id. 
(suggesting potential role of issue linkage in the face of power differentials). One might, furthermore, 
construct a definition of network structures that is broad enough to capture as much. See Verdier, supra 
note 7, at 115–16, 118 (suggesting broader definition, in line with that offered by Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
while seeming to apply a definition that leaves no room for issue linkage). While the possibility of such 
issue linkage does not speak directly to the facilitation of coordination, it suggests that even when 
conflict alters the payoffs of a coordination game into something in the nature of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
networks might still have a role to play. 
 105.  Cf. Brummer, supra note 7, at 343 (noting role of asymmetric information in international 
relations). 
 106.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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international financial regulation, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors’ Recommendation Concerning Mutual Assistance, Cooperation, 
and Sharing of Information played an important role.107 In fostering linkages 
among national regulators and more active information exchange, the 
Recommendation has helped regulators fulfill their duties more effectively and 
efficiently.108 
Beyond information-sharing, transnational networks can play a role in the 
establishment of common standards for disclosure, accounting practices, and 
perhaps even enforcement, when relevant national regulators agree as to 
applicable goals, the appropriate approach, or both. This may, for example, be 
the dynamic with reference to important aspects of antifraud regulation. 
There is relatively widespread transnational consensus around the view of 
financial fraud as worthy of condemnation, and even prosecution.109 At least up 
to a point, then, transnational regulatory networks can help to facilitate 
coordination in the enforcement of antifraud regulation. Minimally, they may 
help to reduce the transaction costs associated with such cooperation.110 Adding 
a dimension of conflict to the mix, transnational regulatory networks can also 
be useful when trust is lacking in the antifraud context. Thus, when assurances 
of mutual commitment to some regulatory undertaking are important, 
regulatory networks can help to generate that assurance. 
Even assuming common recognition of antifraud regulation as beneficial, 
each national regulator might legitimately worry about potential domestic 
pressures on its counterpart regulators that could curtail the extent or the 
quality of those counterparts’ enforcement activity. At a minimum, one might 
be concerned about the prospect that foreign regulators will be distracted from 
an agreed commitment.111 In such circumstances, the coordination dynamic of 
the Stag Hunt, national regulators can be expected to seek some reassurance 
from one another.112 
Transnational regulatory networks, in turn, can help to offer that assurance. 
In particular, networks may do so by making the Pareto superior equilibrium 
more focal. By facilitating, and even encouraging, signaling behavior directed to 
the equilibrium of enforcement, transnational networks may help to increase 
 
 107.  See Zaring, supra note 1, at 300. On the informational orientation of the Basel Committee, see 
Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View From Basel, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 15, 22 (2006). 
 108.  See Zaring, supra note 1, at 300–01. 
 109.  See Licht, supra note 48, at 102–03; Verdier, supra note 7, at 113. 
 110.  A similar account might be offered as to insider trading, when there is agreement as to the 
common benefits of bilateral (and perhaps even unilateral) regulation and enforcement. See Licht, 
supra note 48, at 117–18. There too, one might observe a Harmony game, in which networks play a 
role—not necessarily in facilitating coordination, but simply in reducing transaction costs. 
 111.  See id. at 111. 
 112.  See id. at 109–10. Brummer explicitly acknowledges the role of networks in settings where 
assurance is the key question. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 330. For him, this is the dynamic at work 
when it comes to the regulation of systemic risk. See id. at 331, 363. Even there, however, Brummer 
sees so-called “governmental clubs” as more effective. See id.  
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enforcement’s salience, and thereby increase the prospect of coordination 
around it, among otherwise independent securities market regulators.113 
A similar dynamic might be expected to play out in insider trading 
regulation, where the commitment to aggressive enforcement among national 
regulators is far more attenuated.114 More specifically, the coordination dynamic 
of the Stag Hunt may be especially likely to emerge there, given the willingness 
of each national regulator to act against insider trading only if others are doing 
so as well. In that case, each regulator fears playing the fool, enforcing insider-
trading rules against domestic market participants while its counterpart 
regulators fail to do so.115 
In this circumstance, transnational networks can serve as a source of 
information about the relative level of national regulatory commitment across 
the globe. The networks may also offer a relatively more credible setting for the 
offering of appropriate assurances. To be sure, formal international institutions, 
with uncommon but readily imagined coercive powers, could achieve these ends 
more directly. Networks may suffice, however, given the coordination dynamic 
at work.116 
The potential role of networks, however, does not end with situations in 
which conflict arises solely from a lack of trust. Transnational regulatory 
networks may also be useful in standard-setting, when relevant regulators 
disagree as to the preferred standard. As Chris Brummer highlights, in many 
circumstances national regulators may have distinct regulatory philosophies, the 
adjustment costs to a shared standard may rest more heavily on one regulator 
than another, or the benefits of adjustment may be asymmetrically 
distributed.117 So long as a common standard remains preferable to each 
regulator’s use of its own standard, however, networks can continue to play a 
facilitative role. 
Presentation standards for mandatory disclosures, as opposed to the 
substantive disclosure obligations themselves, exemplify the potential for 
 
 113.  Brummer offers a distinct framing of this dynamic, within which players’ degree of risk 
aversion determines the likely equilibrium point. See id. at 344. In that account, networks may serve to 
modify the level of perceived risk. 
 114.  At the extreme, antifraud regulation also has the potential to exhibit this type of conflictual 
dynamic. There may be double standards in various countries, for example, as to the regulation of 
inbound versus outbound fraud. See Licht, supra note 48, at 109. There may even be disagreement as to 
how bad fraud really is, or as to what particular conduct is problematic. See id. This too may generate a 
Stag Hunt dynamic, in which assurances are needed—and can be facilitated by transnational regulatory 
networks. 
 115.  See id. at 118. This is especially likely to be the dynamic at work when one or both participants 
are focused, at least in part, on their international ranking as a center of financial market activity. See 
id. 
 116.  See id. Licht also offers a distinct account of how a transnational regulatory network might 
contribute in the insider trading context, where a weak state is committed to insider trading regulation, 
even without mutual cooperation. In that circumstance, the network may permit issue linkage designed 
to secure such cooperation. Alternatively, it may allow for face-saving adjustments in the weak state’s 
policy choices. See id. at 121. 
 117.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 349–51. 
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networks to play this harmonizing role.118 Harmonizing such standards is 
especially crucial in the absence of capital market efficiency.119 Even with 
efficient markets, however, harmonization can help to reduce transaction 
costs.120 Yet the abandonment of distinct national standards, which have been 
internalized into the human capital of a given jurisdiction, into relevant 
educational and professional training programs, and into technological systems, 
create “distributional” issues of some significance.121 Significant as they are, 
however, such distributional concerns do not alter the underlying dynamic of 
coordination. Each jurisdiction prefers to settle on a single presentation 
standard for market disclosures, notwithstanding their disagreement as to the 
particular choice. 
What can transnational regulatory networks contribute in the face of this 
Battle of the Sexes? One key contribution may be to render some particular 
outcome relatively more focal. Transnational networks may do so directly, by 
way of their dissemination and promotion of a particular presentation standard. 
But they may also do so less explicitly, through their generation and distribution 
of information more generally. The significant success of the International 
Accounting Standards Board in fostering the harmonization of presentation 
standards (and increasingly substantive standards), even notwithstanding 
substantial U.S. resistance, relied on just these strategies.122 
Beyond their focal point function, transnational regulatory networks may 
also play a role in the face of conflicting standard preferences by offering a face-
saving means for national regulators who have previously embraced one 
disclosure standard to shift to another, without the appearance of conceding 
their sovereign prerogative to a competing sovereign.123 By comparison with the 
latter, embrace of a standard articulated by a transnational network may be 
relatively more palatable. 
Ultimately, even when national regulators engage in active regulatory 
competition, there may be a significant coordination dynamic at work and 
hence a role for transnational regulatory networks to play. This is just the 
dynamic, of course, in international financial regulation, with national 
regulators competing aggressively for trading and other financial market 
activity.124 When one appreciates the nature of that competition, however, the 
 
 118.  See Licht, supra note 48, at 98. A similar account might be offered as to substantive antitrust 
law, which Verdier cites as exemplary of this dynamic. Verdier, supra note 7, at 124. 
 119.  See Licht, supra note 48, at 98. 
 120.  See id. at 99. 
 121.  See id. at 100 (describing investments associated with embrace of a given accounting standard 
for those nations not already utilizing it). 
 122.  See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH U. L. 
REV. 59, 76–78 (2013). It bears emphasizing that the IASB stands apart from the regulatory networks 
discussed herein, given its composition by private parties. See Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global 
Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 250–51 (2005). 
 123.  See Licht, supra note 48, at 101–02. 
 124.  See Brummer, supra note 7, at 352. 
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continued relevance of networks becomes clear. 
In the first order, regulatory competition in the international financial 
markets tends to be over the standard for market activity, rather than in pursuit 
of sharp differentiation.125 Thus, national regulators do not seek to render their 
financial markets unique in some fashion. Rather, their goal is to be fully 
integrated with the international financial markets. Thus, in their competition 
with others over the applicable standard, what national regulators seek is the 
embrace of their standard over some competing one. At the extreme, even 
offshore financial centers do not seek to separate themselves from the financial 
markets, but rather to attract those seeking the most forgiving regulatory 
regime within those markets. 
For the same reason, once any competition over the governing standard for 
trading activity is resolved, few national regulators will have any incentive to 
abandon it. Rather, regulatory competition then shifts to a competition within 
the standard. Each regulator seeks to provide regulatory options that attract 
business to its jurisdiction yet remain within the (however roughly defined) 
parameters of the international financial markets as they have come to exist. 
This is precisely the dynamic of coordination described above. With its 
multiple equilibria, the centrality of expectations and focal points, and the 
stickiness of whatever equilibrium ultimately emerges, regulation of the 
international financial markets fits squarely within the realm of coordination 
game dynamics. As such, those markets offer a natural setting for transnational 
regulatory networks to play a role—however much conflict is also in play. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
In weighing the appropriate architecture of the international order, there 
may be many good reasons to embrace alternatives besides transnational 
regulatory networks. Especially in financial regulation and other areas in which 
they already have a long track record, however, any shift away from such 
networks should happen for the right reasons. And an asserted incapacity to 
navigate conflict is not among those reasons. 
Even in the face of conflict, thus, regulatory networks can play an important 
role in international financial regulation and elsewhere. To be sure, networks 
will not always be effective in that role. Nor will they always be the most 
appropriate means to pursue goals of transnational coordination and 
harmonization. For example, in certain circumstances, transnational networks 
may not offer the speed of decisionmaking needed. Their capacity for 
enforcement may also be inadequate in many situations. 
Whatever deficiencies they may have, however, do not arise because of 
conflicting interests among their participants. In fact, network structures may be 
especially well-suited to navigate such conflicts—even by comparison with 
 
 125.  Cf. id. 
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formal international institutions. Given the dramatically higher barriers to the 
creation of formal international institutions, meanwhile, their creation ought 
not be assumed. In the years ahead, we should consequently expect 
transnational regulatory networks to continue to play a central role. 
 
